Buried Treasure @ “Shepleigh”?
By Pat Rundgren.
It’s often a small, simple enquiry that sets off a train of thought that ends up as major research into a hitherto unexplored aspect of the battle of Rorke’s Drifta and the village of Helpmekaar.
On Friday 21 May 2021, Hugh Scott <nomad4131@aol.com> wrote an e mail to Douglas Rattray of Fugitive’s Drift Lodge -:
“Hello Doug.
I have been keenly interested in the Anglo-Zulu War since I was a child, and as an American, I am sure this is quite an oddity. In the course of my reading and research, I came across an interesting bit of information concerning wagons loaded with supplies heading from Helpmekaar to Rorke’s Drift on January 22. Midway through the trip, it was evident there was a major battle raging at the mission station and the decision was made to turn around and return to Helpmekaar. There was concern that if they were discovered by the Zulus, that returning to Helpmekaar would be too slow with loaded wagons and the supplies could fall to the hands of the Zulu army. The decision was made to bury the supplies with the intent of returning for them later. It is unclear whether or not the supplies were ever recovered, if in fact this ever happened…..
M y question is whether or not you have any information about this? Is it true as far as you know? If those supplies remained buried and have yet to be located, I have a strong interest in attempting to locate this trove of history. This may sound silly to you, a crazy American perhaps, but I am willing to expend the resources to attempt to investigate this on the ground if there is any credence to the report. I realize there would probably be many obstacles to overcome, permission of the land owners, permits, etc. but it would be a worthwhile venture in my opinion, hopefully even with your assistance.
Thank you.
Hugh Scott”.
Doug’s reply was as follows –
“Dear Hugh,
The event that you allude to does appear to have happened. As far as I am aware it was a wagon train coming up to Helpmekaar from Msinga (Pomeroy). I know that a few people have looked in modern history but at the time of the event they had soldiers out probing the ground with their cleaning rods looking for the buried ammunition.
The incident that Douglas is referring to, occurred as survivors fleeing south spread the news of the disastrous outcome of the battle of Isandlwana and the possibility of a Zulu attack into Natal.
“An officer escorting a supply train buried a large quantity of ammunition on a bare hillside before abandoning his wagons and hastening to the next laager. It was several weeks before he was able to return to the site and by then the rains had washed away all trace of the digging. The cache was never located”. It is surmised that the location of this cache is outside Pomeroy at the base of the hills leading up towards Helpmekaar. Despite many efforts to locate it, the site remains undiscovered.
As far as I am aware the 2 Coys of the 24th under Rainforth and Uptcher which had marched out to reinforce Rorkes Drift and who turned back after bumping into the retreating NNC, did not bury any ammunition. I can only assume this, based on the thought that they were convinced that the garrison at RD had fallen and that the Zulus would be onto them next, to keen their ammunition at hand would be of great benefit. Lt William Whitlelock Loyde was with this column’s rear guard as they returned to Helpmekaar and while he does mention a wagon breaking down he certainly does not mention burying the supplies. It’s interesting to think that these men made it to within sight of the garrison of RD and the men of B Coy, fighting to hold the mission station, actually saw them and cheered, thinking relief had come. The effect of their withdrawal and disappearance must have had a crushing effect on the garrison.
I will pore through my books to gather more information on the subject.
Yours,
Douglas”
Hugh then wrote to Pam McFadden, the Curator of Talana Museum in Dundee, as follows –
“Pam–this is the email string between Doug and myself which led me to you. I am guessing he was thinking you may have more detail about the wagon supplies mentioned below.
Any info you can pass along about either subject below would be greatly appreciated.
Thank you very much. I look forward to visiting the museum on my next trip to SA.
Hugh”
Pam, in turn, passed the buck on to me to attempt to answer Hugh’s question, and so here we are.
**
BACKGROUND.
Helpmekaar, on the Biggarsberg heights between Pomeroy and Dundee, was once a thriving way-station for particularly horse-drawn transport (to minimize the risk of animals contracting African horse sickness), complete with an hotel and a couple of thriving General Dealer stores, a Magistracy and Natal Police post. Chosen as a base depot for Lord Chelmsford’s Centre Column invading Zululand in 1879, it assumed an ever-growing significance as the feeder base for the satellite supply depot at the old mission station of Rorke’s Drift in the Buffalo River Valley below the escarpment and, through it, to the entire British column advancing into Zululand.
Today, a few lonely wraiths of fever-stricken men of the Natal Police guard the Police Station from their home in the old cemetery. The hotel has long since disappeared back into the bush. The stores are deserted, vandalized and forgotten. Even the old British fort has disappeared, only to re-appear as a ghostly negative of itself when the outline of the walls can be faintly discerned by the light of the full moon.
But in late 1878 and into 1879 Helpmekaar was a hive of activity. Tons of stores were conveyed by ox wagons off the escarpment towards Rorke’s Drift on an almost daily basis. There is a famous sketch by Major Francis F. White, Paymaster to the 24th Regiment, of Lord Chelmsford’s invading force advancing “across the Buffalo River Valley towards Rorke’s Drift” from Helpmekaar. This sketch was published in the “Graphic” and “Illustrated London News”. The waterfall in the picture identifies the route taken as the Knostrope Pass.
And herein lies the first anomaly of history. One will note that, in the picture, Lord Chelmsford’s column is going the wrong way, UP to Helpmekaar and AWAY from Rorke’s Drift.
The name “Knostrope” has also been mangled by history. The pass is very steep, and the whole district used to turn out to assist wagon trains going up and down – hence the Afrikaans name of their town – “Helpmekaar”, or “help one another’. Draught oxen had a leather strap, or “strop” around their foreheads, which contracted or became thinner – “nou” in Afrikaans – from straining up the hill under their loads. The real name of the pass should therefore be the “Nou-strop” Pass.
There is a switch-back right at the top of the pass, where a so-called “bridle path” branched off and made its way down behind or south of isiNqindi Mountain to what is now “Shepleigh” Farm, which is a few miles from Rorke’s Drift Mission Station. This bridle path was a shorter route to Rorke’s Drift, but suitable only for light wagons and foot traffic.
**
Lieutenant Chard’s on his arrival at Rorke’s Drift had been concerned to find that the Infantry Company designated to provide cover for his pontoons on the Buffalo River had been withdrawn. He accordingly sought permission to travel up to the main camp at Isandlwana on 22nd January to ascertain exactly what was expected of him.
On his return at around midday, Chard had reported to his Commanding Officer, Brevet Major H. Spalding (104th Bengal Fusiliers and in temporary command of the lines of communication at Rorke’s Drift) that he had been informed at Isandlwana that a Company of 24th Regiment under Captain Rainforth was apparently already on the way down from Helpmekaar to assume protective duties at the Rorke’s Drift river crossing. Chard was therefore satisfied that his concerns had been addressed.
Spalding, in turn, had decided to ride up the bridle path towards Helpmekaar to chivvy the reinforcements along, leaving Chard in temporary command at the Drift. According to Chard, “on the 24th instant I as left in command at Rorke’s Drift by Major Spalding, who went to Helpmekaar to hurry in the Company 24th Regiment ordered to protect the ponts”.
After delivering his report to Spalding, Chard then proceeded to his tent at the pontoon crossing point to have lunch. One can assume that Spalding would only have departed for Helpmekaar after also having had his lunch – say around 14:00 (see the “Narrative of Field Operations”). He would have chosen the bridle path as the shorter route and the one where he would most likely find the reinforcing Company if it was already on its way down the mountain. It would have been standard practice for him to have taken a small escort of mounted troops with him, although no mention is made as to who these men might have been.
According to the “Narrative of Field Operations” @ page 47 –“Major Spalding, who had started for Helpmekaar at 2 p.m. on 22nd, reached that place at 3:45 p.m. and afterwards returned to Rorke’s Drift with two Companies of the 1/24th Regiment under Major Upcher”.
This is corroborated by Bancroft who notes that“When Major Spalding had arrived at Helpmekaar, he found that the officer in command there had held back the Company of the 1st Battalion 24th because he felt he could not spare them until reinforcements had reached them. Spalding over-ruled him, and ordered a detachment of troops to follow him back to the mission station”.
So we know that Spalding had to go all the way to Helpmekaar to find his infantry. He arrived there around 16:00 – a fast ride of 10 miles uphill in under two hours. Presumably the infantry was expecting a move, but even then they would not conceivably have been ready to proceed towards Rorke’s Drift much before 16:30 – 17:00.
The two infantry companies, since they were moving house, would probably have set off in light marching order with their heavy packs, food, tentage and camping equipment and spare ammunition in light wagons. Since a battalion carried some 9 tons of tentage/ camping equipment and needed a ton of food per day (some 10 tons for 1000 men) then two companies of infantry (+- 200 men) would have required at least a fifth of that i.e. two tons of stores, excluding ammunition, for the journey – say a minimum of three wagons with full spans of oxen – 48 beasts.
According to the “Narrative of Field Operations” – “Pushing on in advance of the infantry, Major Spalding arrived (at what is now “Shepleigh” farm) at sunset (+- 18:45) within about 3 miles of the post, and there met a body of Zulus who opposed his progress. From this point the mission house was seen to be on fire, and that the assertion of the fugitives that the post had fallen appeared to be correct. On rejoining the infantry, therefore, Major Spalding ordered them to march back towards Helpmekaar. This place was the principal advanced depot for the centre column, and contained large stores of ammunition and provisions, and for the protection of these stores, the defences which had been commenced by the fugitives from Isandhlana (sic), were strengthened by the return of the troops at 9 p.m.”
Major Spalding and, presumably, his escort, would have been mounted and made far quicker progress than his force of infantry. If he reached “Shepleigh” at about 18:45, at that time the infantry would only have been marching for less than two hours. Slowed down by ox-drawn transport, they would probably have not even reached the top of the “Nou Strop” Pass by sunset.
In “Nothing Remains but to Fight”, Ian Knight recounts that about sunset the Rorke’s Drift garrison had been forced to abandon the hospital and had retired to a position in front of the storeroom – “Not long after the men had fallen back to the line of biscuit boxes, a rumour went round that a cloud of dust could be seen on the road towards Helpmekaar”. Walter Dunne who had been keeping watch, says that he saw it, Chard could not, but “a cheer was raised. “The garrison though it was Rainforth’s Company, coming down at last to their aid”
If one accepts the argument that the infantry were turned around and returned to Helpmekaar by 9 p.m., then they could not have progressed far enough by sunset to be visible to the defenders at the Rorke’s Drift mission station. And they would have had no reason to abandon their wagons unless one broke down and could not be repaired. There is no evidence of such an occurrence.
According to Bancroft “The Major rode in front, and about three miles from Rorke’s Drift came upon some abandoned wagons, a number of which were still loaded. He then met several fugitives fleeing towards Helpmekaar. About a mile further on they met Lieutenant Henderson and Bob Hall, who brought attention to a column of smoke rising from the hills in the direction of the Drift. Although the buildings were not visible … Major Spalding decided to turn back. It was never ascertained if these were the red-coats that the men in the garrison had thought they had seen soon after the Zulu attack started”.
So, then, if the defenders had indeed seen “reinforcements” allegedly coming to their aid, it could not have been Rainforth and Upcher’s companies. That being the case, then the wagons referred to would not have been theirs either. Could the “reinforcements” have been Spalding’s advance party or else a flurry of fugitives fleeing the other way towards Helpmekaar?
Or was it simply someone’s imagination? The foot of the bridle path is not visible from the mission station, and Chard confirms that he was unable to see any reinforcements.
It is most likely that the relieving companies were accompanied by at least a few wagons, but in the time allowed would never have reached anywhere close to Rorke’s Drift before turning back There was therefore no reason to abandon them, far less to take the trouble of burying their contents. With Helpmekaar under imminent threat, there is no way on earth that any decent professional soldier would abandon his ammunition in an effort to save his skin.
As already discussed, Bancroft makes the statement that “The Major rode in front, and about three miles from Rorke’s Drift came upon some abandoned wagons, a number of which were still loaded”. Since it is not corroborated elsewhere, is this just wishful thinking on Bancroft’s part?
But it might be the origin of Hugh’s query?
If there were indeed SOME light wagons from SOMEWHERE at the foot of the bridle path, it is possible that they might have been damaged or broken down in the passage up and down the mountain and had been parked off for later repair? But if they were heavy transport wagons they would not have been there – they would have utilised the “Nou-strop” Pass route instead.
Even if some wagons were there, no one in his right mind would have stopped to bury their contents in their frenzy to escape the approaching Zulu hordes. This is akin to expecting the Isandlwana survivors to bury their 1400 odd tons of kit and equipment before escaping. And IF any wagons were there and IF the Zulus found them, their contents would have suffered an immediate change of ownership.
So, then, gut feel. NO, it is highly unlikely that there is any buried treasure at Shepleigh waiting to be unearthed.
But I would like to believe that both the Queen’s and Regimental Colours of the 2/ 24th Regiment, lost at Isandlwana, are still out in Zululand somewhere. Now, that would be treasure indeed!
**
